

The Protection of Shareholders in International Investment Law & Arbitration

SustainEUorPlanet Seminar

07.04.2025

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Why shareholder claims in international law?

- Imagine that, in the wake of a political turmoil, State A **proceeds to revoke** all the licenses of the largest national oil company, **leaving the entity as an empty shell** with no value or profitable business.
- Imagine also that State B has annexed half of State C. To consolidate its power, companies owned by political opponents are charged with tax evasion, fraud and corruption in order to **force them into bankruptcy**.
- In both cases, shareholders – holding a fraction of the company's capital – are left empty-handed: they retain formal ownership, but the **value of their investment** is completely annihilated. Which are the **remedies** under international law? Who is entitled to bring a claim?

Shareholder claims **under municipal law**

- The need to look at municipal law: an **understanding of how company law addresses** the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders is fundamental to scrutinize the international law rules.
- **Methodology**: comparative company law to ascertain the rules on the protection of shareholders and identify their foundations. Analysis of more than **25 jurisdictions**, including Argentina, Australia, Colombia, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, South Africa, USA.
- **The main questions**: have shareholders standing in respect of measures affecting the corporation in which they own shares? Why do domestic legal orders allow or prohibit to recover such a loss?

The **results** of the comparative analysis

- All domestic legal orders recognize the institution of the **corporation**, namely a legal entity possessing its own personality (thus the capacity to hold rights and duties autonomously) and patrimonial autonomy.
- A **distinction is firmly drawn** between the rights of the corporation and those of the shareholders. This being known as the **corporate veil**: a barrier between the wealth of the shareholders and the entity assets.
- When the **rights** of the shareholders (e.g., property or right to vote at general meetings) are infringed upon, judicial remedies are provided. However, a **general prohibition** to recover a loss that is reflective of the damage suffered by the corporation (so-called **reflective loss**) is upheld.

The **general prohibition** of reflective loss claims

- **Why** reflective loss claims are generally prohibited in domestic corporate law? The jurisprudence of domestic courts as well as doctrine have advanced **different theories**.
- Traditionally, the prohibition is considered a **logical consequence** of the corporate legal personality: different persons, different damages, different remedies. Others say it is a matter of **causal link**.
- In my view, the prohibition is grounded on **legal policy grounds**: capital maintenance and creditor protection, avoiding risks of double recovery and jeopardy, safeguarding corporate governance, preventing parallel proceedings concerning the same measures to be brought.

Shareholder claims under **general international law**

- In the late 19th century, whether – under international law – shareholders were entitled to claim for damages suffered by the corporation was much debated: **fragmented and incoherent practice**.
- No chance to **identify a rule** supporting the admissibility of reflective loss claims. Quite the opposite, the *Delagoa Bay Railway* (1900) and *El Triunfo* (1902) arbitrations actually prove the opposite.
- The **leading case** is the *Barcelona Traction Ltd.*, decided by the International Court of Justice in 1970. Application filed by Belgium on behalf of its national shareholders, following a series of wrongful measures taken by Spain against the corporation.

The *Barcelona Traction* case: establishing the rule

- The starting point: «international law is called upon to recognize institutions of municipal law that have an important and extensive role in the international field».
- Moving from this consideration, the Court adopted the domestic clear-cut distinction between the rights of the corporation and the rights of its shareholders → **general principle *in foro domestico*** (Article 38(1)c).
- Accordingly, under general international law, shareholders are protected only when a wrongful act impacts upon their **direct rights**. Contrariwise, if the measures affect the **rights of the company**, shareholders – as a general rule – will have no claim.

A good rule... but a **weak rationale?**

- The Court was accused of having limited its inquiry to municipal law, **rather than fashioning** a new rule for shareholder claims based on international law and its different needs to be fulfilled.
- This approach is incorrect! It is not for the ICJ to make the rules. Moreover, the reasons supporting the prohibition in domestic legal orders are **equally valid** in the international sphere: plethora of parallel proceedings, with risks of conflicting decisions and double jeopardy.
- The Court considered that the foundation of such a rule was the legal personality of corporations, thus carving out **very few exceptions**: this was later reaffirmed in the *Diallo* case (2007).

Shareholder claims in **international investment law**

- Currently, in international investment arbitration, the **vast majority** of the proceedings is brought by the shareholder for damages suffered by the corporation in which they hold shares.
- What is prohibited under domestic and general international law is permissible in international investment law: shareholders can bring reflective loss claims. The rule has been **superseded** by the exception.
- This means that the corporate veil, the barrier between the shareholders and the corporation, **is pierced**. How is it possible? Since investment treaties are **generally silent** on shareholder claims, attention shall be paid to the reasoning of investment tribunals.

Investment tribunals on shareholder claims

- The starting point is that, generally, **shareholders qualify as investors** and their **shares as investments**. However, this does not answer the question as to what a shareholder might be entitled to claim before an arbitral tribunal. This only means they can bring proceedings!
- What about the *Barcelona Traction* rule? In *CMS v. Argentina* (2003), the tribunal **excluded its relevance**: the ICJ dealt with diplomatic protection, while the US-Argentina BIT was *lex specialis*.
- In *Cemex v. Venezuela* (2010), the arbitral tribunal concluded that, inasmuch as **indirect investments are protected** under the BIT, shareholder claims for reflective loss shall be admitted.

The patent **ungovernability** of shareholder claims

- If it is true that the blanket admissibility of reflective loss **made the fortune** of the system, such an approach by investment tribunals **threatens the legitimacy** of investor-State arbitration.
- In *Lauder v. Czech Republic* (2001) and *CME v. Czech Republic* (2003) the arbitral tribunals reached an **opposite conclusion** on the merits for the same facts: no violation by the first, expropriation by the second. Think about the **corporate chain of a multinational enterprise!**
- In *Kappes and Kappes v. Guatemala* (2020), the arbitral tribunal **ignored the treaty language** which was arguably intended to limit reflective loss claims, concluding that the choice is up to the investor.

The **interpretative tools** to address the conundrum

- Leaving aside the question as to whether the broad and often vague treaty language adopted in investment treaties can really be said to support reflective loss claims, **solutions are much needed**.
 1. **Abuse of process**, consisting in the use of procedural instruments for purposes that are alien to those for which they were established → *Orascom v. Algeria* (2017) «[i]f the protection is sought at one level of the vertical chain [...] that purpose is fulfilled».
 2. **Res judicata**, meaning that the final adjudication by a court or arbitral tribunal is conclusive and, thus, the dispute cannot be relitigated before any other judicial institution → «**triple identity test**».

Rethinking the protection of shareholders

- There are no easy solutions when the problem is **deeply rooted** within the system. Despite no unanimous views, it is apparent that the system requires a **rapid response** to ensure its legitimacy and viability.
- The establishment of a **general prohibition** to claim reflective loss (OECD and UNCITRAL proposals), recognizing the soundness of the legal policy grounds advanced in domestic legal orders.
- However, **exceptions are necessary** when they pursue a different interest which is worthy of protection. There is still a long way forward: why States do not act? How to implement the solution in over 3000 investment treaties? Shall we rethink the whole system of protection?



**Thank you for your
attention!**

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